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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The utilities for the new and used product in the second period will be:
U2 = θ − p2
and
Uu = δθ − pu − h
where h is the license fee
Solving for the "indifferent" consumer, we get the following inverse demand equations
θ1 =





Which lead us to the following inverse demand functions:
price of new products : p2 = −q2 + 1− quδ
price of used products : pu = −quδ + δ − q2δ − h
the respective profits will be :
Maxq2 Π2(q2|qu) = (p2 − c)q2 + hqu = (1− q2 − quδ − c) q2 + hqu
s.t q2 ≥ 0





+ 1)− p∗1 (1)
qu ≥ 0
The Lagrangian for the RM’s problem is
L(qu, s, λ1, λ2) =Πu(qu, s) + λ1(s(
1
γ
+ 1)− p∗1 − qu) + λ2(q1 − qu) + µ1qu








γ + 1)− p
∗
1 − qu) = 0
0
λ2(q1 − qu) = 0
µ1qu = 0
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, µ1 ≥ 0,
Assume s( 1γ + 1)− p1 − qu > 0 ,then λ1 = 0. In this case,
∂L
∂s = −qu  0.




will be a contradiction. Therefore, ∂L∂s = −qu < 0 .
Since this case can not meet the FOC (∂L
∂s
= 0), from hereafter we assume that inequality (1)
holds as an equality. Intuitively, the entrant would not be willing to buy more used units than the
quantity she would launch in the secondary market.
Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 1 we know that, qu = s(
1







Therefore, we can rewrite the entrant’s problem as:










while the OEM’s objective is given by:
Maxq2 Π2 = (−q2 + 1− qu δ − c) q2 + h
∗qu
q2 ≥ 0
We solve the following problem by assuming that constraint (3) is not binding at the optimal
solution. After determining the optimal first period price (p∗1) and the corresponding optimal
quantity (q∗1) we verify our assumption by substituting this value to constraint (3) and showing
that it always holds as a strict inequality.
Solving simultaneously for the quantities of the two competitors, we obtain the following Nash
Equilibria (N.E) :
q∗2 = −
2 δ + 2 δ γ + 2γ − δ2 − δ2γ + δ h∗ + δ h∗γ + δ γp∗1 − 2 δ c− 2 δ γc− 2 γc




−δ γ + 2h∗ + 2h∗γ − δ − δ c+ 2 γp∗1 − δ γc
−4 δ − 4 δ γ − 4 γ + δ2 + δ2γ
(5)
substituting q∗u from (5),
(2) can be rewritten as :
s =
γ(−δ γ + 2h∗ + 2h∗γ − δ − δ c− 2 γp∗1 − δ γc− 4 δ p
∗





(−4 δ − 4 δ γ − 4 γ + δ2 + δ2γ)(1 + γ)
First Period Analysis
The price in the first period, is given by
p1 = 1− q1 + s (6)
solving simultaneously (??) and (6) we get
p1 = −
(−q1 δ
2γ+4 q1 γ+4 q1 δ γ+δ
2γ−4 γ+2hγ−5 δ γ−δ γc+4 q1 δ−q1δ
2−4 δ+δ2)(1+γ)
4 δ+4 δ γ+4 γ+2 γ2−δ2−δ2γ
First period profits are consist of only the sales from new products :
Π1(q1, h) = (p1 − c)q1
st q1 ≥ 0, h ≥ 0
and the cumulative profits over the two periods will be Π = Π1+ Π2
The OEM’s overall objective will be :
Maxq1,h Π(q1, h)








q1 ≥ 0 (7)
h ≥ γq1 +A (8)
h ≤ γq1 +B (9)
h ≥ 0
where A = −δ γ
2−γ2+γ2c+δ2γ+2 δ γc−3 δ γ−2 γ+2 γc+δ2−2 δ+2 δ c
δ (1+γ) and B =
δ(1+c)
2 − γ
Note that, B −A = (4δ+4δγ+4γ+2γ
2−δ2−δ2γ)(1−c)
2δ(1+γ) > 0 for c < 1,so A < B.
The Lagrangean is:
L(q1, h, λ1, λ2) =Π(q1, h) + λ1(γq1 +B − h) + λ2(h− γq1 −A) + µ1q1 + µ2h







λ1(γq1 +B − h) = 0 (12)
λ2(h− γq1 −A) = 0 (13)
µ1q1 = 0 (14)
µ2h = 0 (15)
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0
Case 1. γq1 +B − h = 0 and q1 > 0, then λ2 = 0, µ1 = 0, µ2 = 0.




and h = −12
−δγc+cγ−δc+γ2−δ−δγ+γ
1+γ
We need λ1 ≥ 0 which holds only for δ <
γ
1+γ
since 4δ + 4δγ + 4γ + 2γ2 − δ2(1 + γ) > 0
3
Also, h ≥ 0 holds only for c < δ(1+γ)−γ−γ
2
γ−δ−γδ .
However, when δ < γ1+γ , then
δ(1+γ)−γ−γ2
γ−δ−γδ < 0 and since c <
δ(1+γ)−γ−γ2
γ−δ−γδ ., we conclude that
c < 0 which is false.
Since, λ1 ≥ 0 and h ≥ 0 can not be satisfied simultaneously, this case can not meet the conditions
for optimality.
In other words, constraint (9), is not binding at the optimal solution, and thus, q∗u > 0
Case 2. (h− γq1 −A) = 0,and q1 > 0 then λ1 = 0, µ1 = 0, µ2 = 0.
Solving (10) and (11) gives
λ2 =
−8δc+ 8γ − 8cγ + δ2γc− 3δ2γ − 6δγc+ δ2c− 3δ2 + 8δ(1 + γ)





4δc− 4γ + 4γc+ 2δ2γ + 3δγc+ 2δ2 − 4δ − 5δγ − δγ2
δ(1 + γ)
(17)
We need λ2 ≥ 0 or equivalently
−8δc+ 8γ − 8cγ + δ2γc− 3δ2γ − 6δγc+ δ2c− 3δ2 + 8δ(1 + γ) ≤ 0 (18)
since δ(−4δ − 4δγ − 4γ − 2γ2 + δ2(1 + γ)) < 0.
(18) is equivalent to c ≥ (1+γ)(3δ
2−8δ)−8γ
−8γ+δ2(1+γ)−8δ−6δγ
for δ > γ1+γ ,
(1+γ)(3δ2−8δ)−8γ
−8γ+δ2(1+γ)−8δ−6δγ
< 1 and thus (18) is possible.




Again for δ > γ(γ+2)2(1+γ) ,
δγ2−2δ2+4δ+5δγ+4γ−2δ2γ










in which case h > 0
Case 3. h− γq1 −A = 0 and γq1 +B − h = 0 then λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0, µ1 = 0, µ2 = 0 (since A = B)







this case can also be feasible (at the optimality) as long as








Case 4. h− γq1 −A = 0 and γq1 +B − h = 0,then A = B which is false since A < B
so this case can not occur .
Case 5. h = 0 and q1 = 0,then λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0, µ1 = 0
since δ > γ > γ1+γ the case becomes feasible for c ≥
3δ2γ2−3δ3γ+11δ2γ−3δ3−8γ2−8δγ2+8δ2
δ3+δ3γ−δ2γ
To summarize the above Lagrangean analysis, we have the following conditions :
for c ≤ 3δ
2γ2−3δ3γ+11δ2γ−3δ3−8γ2−8δγ2+8δ2
δ3+δ3γ−δ2γ




we fall into case 5.
Finally, for very high values of c ≥ (1+γ)(3δ
2−8δ)−8γ
−8γ+δ2(1+γ)−8δ−6δγ
case 2 (q2 = 0) becomes also feasible.
Proof of Remark 1




















> 0 and h∗is decreasing in δ.
To prove that h∗is decreasing in γ it is sufficient to show that the numerator of (19) is decreasing
in γ.




= 4c − 5δ + 3cδ − 2γδ + 2δ2 − 4 = 4(c − 1) + 3δ(c − 1) − 2γδ + 2δ(δ − 1) which is obviously
negative for c < 1.




= 12δ+2γδ (4γ + 4δ + 3γδ) > 0
Similarly, we prove the properties for case 3, where
h∗ = 12
δ3γc+3 δ3γ+δ3c+3 δ3−3 δ2γ2−δ2γc−11 δ2γ−8 δ2+8 γ2+8 δ γ2
3 δ2γ+3 δ2−8 δ γ−8 δ−8 γ







Proof of Proposition 2
The utilities for the new and used product in the second period will be:
U2 = θ − p2 and Ur = δθ − pu − h where h is the license fee
Solving for the "indifferent" consumer, we get the following inverse demand equations
θ1 =














the respective profits will be :
OEM : Maxq2 Π2 =
(









s.t q2 ≥ 0
and for the ith RM : Maxqi
u

















then we can rewrite the OEM’s and RM’s problems as :
OEM : Maxq2 Π2 =
(











s.t q2 ≥ 0
and for the ith RM : Maxqi
u















The FOC with respect to q2 and q
i
r




u − c = 0




u − s = 0
however, since we assume N symmetric remanufacturers Q−iu = (N − 1)q
i
u
and the FOC can be rewritten as
−2q2 + 1− δNq
i
u − c = 0 (21)
δ − q2δ − h− δ(N + 1)q
i
u − s = 0 (22)




+ 1)− p1 (23)
solving simultaneously (21) ,(22) ,and (23)
we get the equilibrium quantities
6
q2 = −
γN+δ+δγ+δ N+γNδ−δ2N−δ2Nγ+δ Nh+δ Nγh+δ Nγp1−cγN−δ c−γδ c−Nδ c−γNδ c
−2 γN−2 δ−2 δ γ−2 δ N−2 γNδ+δ2N+δ2Nγ
qu =
−δ−δ γ+2h+2 γh−δ c−γδ c+2 γp1
−2 γN−2 δ−2 δ γ−2 δ N−2 γNδ+δ2N+δ2Nγ
s =
γ(−δ N+2Nh−2 δ p1−Nδ c+δ2Np1−2 δ Np1)
−2 γN−2 δ−2 δ γ−2 δ N−2 γNδ+δ2N+δ2Nγ
From hereafter we proceed as in the case of one RM:




equal to zero so that we derive the q∗1(h).
We can now substitute this value to the expression for the OEM’s profits and apply the FOC
with respect to h (since the function is concave in h)










−γ2 − γ + δ + 2 δ γ + δ γ2
)
(







−γ2 − γ + δ + 2 δ γ + δ γ2
) (
3 δ2 + 3 δ2γ − 4 δ γ − 4 δ − 4 γ
)
(
3 δ2N + 3 δ2Nγ − 4γNδ − 4 δ N − 4 δ γ − 4 δ − 4γN
)3
Since we are in the case of positive license fees δ > γ1+γ ⇔ δ(1 + γ) > γ ⇔
δ(1 + γ)2 > γ(1 + γ)⇔
(






Also, we can readily see that
(

















δ2γ2 + 2 δ2γ + δ2 − 2 δ γ2 − 2 δ γ + γ2
)
(





δ c2(δ2γ2+2 δ2γ+δ2−2 δ γ2−2 δ γ+γ2)(3 δ2+3 δ2γ−4 δ γ−4 δ−4 γ)




δ2γ2 + 2 δ2γ + δ2 − 2 δ γ2 − 2 δ γ + γ2
)
= δ(1 + γ)[δ(1 + γ)− 2 δ γ] + γ2 > 0
(











By substituting the optimal license fee, to the second period equation we derive the correspond-
ing expressions and the proofs regarding the properties are similar .
7
Along the same lines, we can prove that ∂q
∗
r



































3 δ2 + 3 δ2γ − 4 δ γ − 4 δ − 4γ
)
(




















3 δ2 + 3 δ2γ − 4 δ γ − 4 δ − 4 γ
)
(





(δ + δ γ − γ) gδ c
(





(δ + δ γ − γ) γδ c
(
3 δ2 + 3 δ2γ − 4 δ γ − 4 δ − 4γ
)
(
3 δ2N + 3 δ2Nγ − 4 γNδ − 4 δ N − 4 δ γ − 4 δ − 4 γN
)3
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